Stephen Cambone
Stephen Cambone
Stephen A. Cambonewas the first United States Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a post created in March 2003. Cambone first came to the attention of the public at large during the testimony of Major General Antonio Taguba before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, where he disputed the General's statement that prison guards were under the effective control of military intelligence personnel and interrogators. Cambone resigned at the beginning of 2007 and was replaced by James R. Clapper, Jr.,...
NationalityAmerican
ProfessionPolitician
CountryUnited States of America
And then fourth, we have that essential group of people who track programs and budgets to ensure that they align with the needs of preparation and warning, counterintelligence and support to the operational war fighter.
And to do that not only for the war fighter, but also to help prepare the people in the acquisition, personnel and policy worlds who need to make adjustments in the department's business, which itself may take 10 or 15 years to accomplish.
When you live in a networked environment, it's possible to separate data from applications.
But by providing the background picture - the universal situational awareness that we desire - by showing the anomalies, the Space-Based Radar will change the nature of how we do our analysis and our intelligence.
In other words, by finding the anomalous event, what you do is you get out ahead of activities.
One is to ensure that the war fighters and the intelligence analysts get the information that they need when they need it, in a format that's useful to them.
Over the course of two years, we arrived at a point where we began to look at the value added by making information more easily accessible across the intelligence community, both defense and national.
That is really not much different from the search engines that are being constructed today for users throughout the entire world to allow them to search through databases to access the information that they require.
The users are not going to be in the position of accepting what's been collected; they're going to be in the position of being able to demand collection.
Our focus is on outputs rather than inputs.
It's easy to measure success by the number of dollars spent or by the number of programs initiated, without having too much regard for what was bought and how useful it was to the people who need it - the war fighter and the analyst.