Gottfried Leibniz
Gottfried Leibniz
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnizwas a German polymath and philosopher who occupies a prominent place in the history of mathematics and the history of philosophy, having developed differential and integral calculus independently of Isaac Newton. Leibniz's notation has been widely used ever since it was published. It was only in the 20th century that his Law of Continuity and Transcendental Law of Homogeneity found mathematical implementation. He became one of the most prolific inventors in the field of mechanical calculators. While...
NationalityGerman
ProfessionPhilosopher
Date of Birth1 July 1646
CityLeipzig, Germany
CountryGermany
There is no way in which a simple substance could begin in the course of nature, since it cannot be formed by means of compounding.
And there must be simple substances, because there are compounds; for the compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simples.
But in simple substances the influence of one monad over another is ideal only.
Thus God alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and derived, are produced.
The monad, of which we shall speak here, is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds; simple, that is to say, without parts.
Now this connection or adaption of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.
There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible: truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary.
Every present state of a simple substance is the natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future.
And as every state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, so that the present state of it is big with the future.
Finally there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given; there are also axioms or postulates, or in a word primary principles, which cannot be proved and have no need of proof.
It can have its effect only through the intervention of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God a monad rightly demands that God, in regulating the rest from the beginning of things, should have regard to itself.
I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general.
It follows from what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause would be unable to influence their inner being.
There are also two kinds of truths: truth of reasoning and truths of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; those of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible.